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In less than two decades, large marine protected areas have become an 
increasingly important strategy in attempts to sustain ocean life threat-
ened by climate change, overfishing, marine pollution, and other impacts 
(Toonen and others 2013; Wilhelm and others 2014). Proponents claim 
that over 80 percent of all protected marine space now exists within large 
areas that measure in the hundreds of thousands to millions of square 
kilometers (Toonen and others 2013). Pacific Island countries have been 
global leaders in this movement to design ocean stewardship at scale 
and have used these achievements as evidence that Small Island Devel-
oping States are better thought of as Large Ocean States (Maclellan 
2012). Pacific Island leaders such as President Anote Tong of Kiribati and 
Prime Minister Henry Puna of the Cook Islands have made political and 
moral declarations about the global significance of their nations’ exten-
sive marine territorial rights and cultural heritage of sustainability. These 
claims are evocative of Epeli Hau‘ofa’s well-known critiques of Pacific 
regional development paradigms and his argument that Pacific Islands are 
not small or isolated by the ocean but rather connected through it and the 
expansive practices of its residents (Hau‘ofa 1994). However, despite the 
growing importance of large marine protected areas within and beyond 
Oceania, almost no scholarship exists about the particular cultural, social, 
and political processes through which they emerge.1 
In this ethnographic essay, I explore the inception of the Cook Islands 
Marine Park, a proposal to develop an approximately one-million-square-
kilometer mixed-use marine protected area in the southern half of the 
Cook Islands exclusive economic zone (eez).2 I begin to paint a clearer 
picture of what large-scale marine management means and what it can 
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mean, specifically, in a Pacific Islands context. The Cook Islands Marine 
Park is also known by the Māori name Marae Moana, which is often 
translated for general audiences as “Sacred Ocean.”3 In following the 
park’s development, I show that although several stakeholder groups in 
the Cook Islands did not initially support the marine park concept, the 
process of making Marae Moana became a way of rearticulating national 
values and aspirations in the face of serious challenges like sluggish eco-
nomic development, climate change, local environmental degradation, 
and emigration. As it developed, Marae Moana became an important 
nation-making project that integrated previous national concerns within a 
new idiom of large-scale marine environmental management. 
In this article, I claim that a history of scandal in the Cook Islands was 
an important precondition for how many came to understand the marine 
park and that this succession of scandals is associated with structural con-
ditions such as the size of the state apparatus and public responses to what 
is perceived, by some, as a lack of government transparency. In doing so, 
I draw on work by Cook Islands scholar and environmentalist Jacqueline 
Evans, who has claimed that scandal in the Cook Islands has been con-
ditioned by “bureaucratic thinness,” that is, the relatively large influence 
of a few individuals working within the bureaucratic structure of micro-
states (Evans 2006). I extend this argument by claiming that bureaucratic 
thinness is also paired with what I call “informatic thinness” in the Cook 
Islands. Informatic thinness means that relatively few individuals within 
the state apparatus control the production and flow of officially sanc-
tioned information. In the Cook Islands, both bureaucratic and informatic 
thinness have contributed to the production of scandal, in part because 
publically available forms of information such as rumor and gossip tended 
to gain national publicity as more formal sources of information became 
less available or less trusted. I draw on work by anthropologists, sociolo-
gists, and political scientists to argue that scandal has been an important 
means of clarifying and reaffirming values and norms associated with a 
sense of national identity. Specifically, scandals revolving around gov-
ernment transparency and fisheries management transformed the Cook 
Islands Marine Park into a space for negotiating social norms and moral 
values and has contributed to what appears to be a shifting sense of the 
Cook Islands as a Large Ocean State. In making this argument, I begin 
to foreground scandal as a key feature of political life. While scandal in 
the Pacific has been satirically explored in fiction, such as in Hau‘ofa’s 
Tales of the Tikongs (1983), and while particular scandals have been regu-
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lar objects of concern in political reviews in The Contemporary Pacific, 
the formative role of scandal and scandalization in Pacific Islands politics 
has received little attention. In the second part of this essay, I outline the 
case that previous nation-making projects such as those concerned with 
modernization, traditional culture, and tourism have not been abandoned 
but are being approached and integrated in new ways under a broad 
rubric of large-scale ocean management. I refer to this shift as “big ocean 
nationalism.”
Ethnographic fieldwork was conducted over fourteen months, from 
July 2011 to September 2012, and included nine months as an intern with 
the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (sprep) 
and five months housed in the Cook Islands National Environment Ser-
vice building in Avarua, Rarotonga. While working in the Cook Islands, I 
observed meetings of the Cook Islands Marine Park Steering Committee, 
an interim multi-stakeholder body that advised government on creating 
a national large-scale marine park. I also conducted in-depth interviews 
with members of the steering committee from government ministries, non-
governmental organizations, the Aronga Mana (traditional leaders), and 
other interested parties. Additionally, I participated in public events such 
as the annual Cook Islands Lagoon Day and analyzed public discourse as 
represented in national media including Cook Islands News, the nation’s 
most prominent news source. I observed public stakeholder meetings 
related to the marine park, a proposed shark sanctuary, deep-sea minerals 
mining, and fisheries. The last event I attended in an ethnographic capac-
ity was the 43rd Pacific Islands Forum Leaders’ Meeting, where the gov-
ernment’s intention to create the Cook Islands Marine Park was officially 
declared. 
Making Marae Moana: An Ethnographic Account  
of an Unfinished Project 
When Kevin Iro presented his idea for a Cook Islands Marine Park to a 
room full of cabinet ministers, he was not known as a nature conserva-
tionist or a marine scientist. Rather, he was famous for playing profes-
sional rugby and for his extensive community work in the Cook Islands 
through his church and the Cook Islands Sports Academy, a school with 
an emphasis on athletic training. In 2008, while serving together on the 
Cook Islands Tourism Board, Iro and his friend Robin Grant became 
concerned with the same problem: Both men wanted to persuade more 
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tourists to choose the Cook Islands over other destinations with similar 
beaches, climate, and entertainment. The marketing of traditional Cook 
Islands culture was one primary way the state had previously attempted 
to meet this challenge (Sissons 1999), but travelers could still go to other 
Polynesian islands and have what many tourists would consider a similar 
experience. 
The marine park concept was simple at first. The Cook Islands has one 
of the largest exclusive economic zones in the Pacific, but, as far as Iro 
and Grant could tell, the government was only using its sovereign rights 
within approximately two million square kilometers of ocean for com-
mercial fishing. They came to believe that tourists, especially environmen-
tally concerned tourists, would pay a premium to visit the largest marine 
park in the world. Iro presented the idea to Wilkie Rasmussen, then the 
minister of marine resources, who became the principal advocate for the 
idea in the government until the Cook Islands Party won the national elec-
tions in November 2010. Iro also made presentations to members of the 
House of Ariki and the Koutu Nui—organizations of traditional leaders 
also know as the Aronga Mana—that were instituted after the initiation 
of self-government and that have occupied shifting roles within nation-
making projects and national discourse in the Cook Islands (Crocombe 
1979; Sissons 1999). Both branches of the Aronga Mana supported Iro’s 
idea from the beginning, while the new government, now under the lead-
ership of Prime Minister Henry Puna, continued to support the previous 
government’s policy by endorsing the marine park concept. In early 2010, 
the cabinet approved the development of an overarching policy for a Cook 
Islands Marine Park and the establishment of a marine park charitable 
trust, including a group of people who would be responsible for adminis-
tering the park and its resources. 
However, despite nominal approval from the cabinet, the marine park 
idea was not, at first, strongly supported by government administrators 
and scientists, Cook Islands environmental nongovernmental organiza-
tions, or other stakeholders who chose to express their opinions through 
national media outlets. Key technical staff within the National Environ-
ment Service, the Ministry of Marine Resources (mmr), and Te Ipukarea 
Society (a grassroots environmental organization) believed that smaller 
traditional marine protected areas (ra‘ui) should be the focus of marine 
conservation efforts because reef areas enclosed by ra‘ui contain the high-
est density of marine biodiversity. One member of the Marine Park Steer-
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ing Committee summarized the early lack of support for the idea among 
most stakeholders at the time:
There was little public engagement initially. Kevin approached cabinet first, 
and then he was asked to get comments from the Environment Service and 
Marine Resources and come back to cabinet. The public meetings began over 
a year later, around the time of the constitution celebrations. Marine [Ministry 
of Marine Resources] and Environment [National Environment Service] didn’t 
like the idea. Maybe because the ministers in cabinet are telling their staff, 
“this is what you need to do,” and the staff are thinking, “we are the technical 
people, we should know.” It just put them offside, I think. Environment Service 
is coming around, I think, but Marine Resources has been much slower. When 
it came to engagement with the media, the newspaper kept calling Kevin and 
he wasn’t filling them in, and he was sending them to the Office of the Prime 
Minister. And engagement didn’t happen until much later and by then there 
was a lot of public speculation about the marine park trust and who was on it. 
So people started opposing the idea and wondering about the motives. 
Much of the criticism in public discourse, as represented in national 
media outlets, stemmed from suspicions that the proposed marine park 
trust was a ruse for hijacking public resources for the personal gain of 
individual trustees. One letter to the editor of Cook Islands News explic-
itly linked criticism of the marine park trust with perceptions of corrup-
tion in the mmr and the way it granted commercial fishing licenses. The 
author speculated: “Rumours are that the perpetrators of this scam [the 
trust] are politicians and a couple of Heads of Ministries (homs) with one 
prominent business person. One particular hom is a person that I believe 
has been conning this country for quite a while now. I believe the person is 
also involved with the fishing licence scam” (cin 2011c). These suspicions 
were exacerbated by minimal government communication about what the 
marine park was or how the trust would function. 
Experts Visit Rarotonga
Iro’s idea for a Cook Islands Marine Park continued to live a spectral 
existence until July 2011 when it appeared to make a dramatic transition 
from being primarily an object of public rebuke and technical criticism to 
gaining overwhelming stakeholder support. Opinion shifted after Prime 
Minister Puna invited Sue Taei from Conservation International and Tim 
Carruthers from sprep to visit Rarotonga and talk about their experience 
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developing large-scale marine protected areas. Taei had been intimately 
involved in the creation of the Phoenix Islands Protected Area in Kiribati, 
which at the time of its declaration was claimed to be the largest marine 
protected area in the world. Carruthers had experience with marine spa-
tial planning and had reviewed the Water Quality Protection Plan for the 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, the first large-scale marine park in the 
world. Taei and Carruthers met with stakeholders on Rarotonga from the 
11th to the 14th of July 2011. They consulted with the prime minister, 
the deputy prime minister, the deputy leader of the Opposition, repre-
sentatives from government ministries, a representative from Te Ipukarea 
Society, and members of the House of Ariki and the Koutu Nui. They also 
conducted public meetings in each of the three major districts (vaka) on 
Rarotonga. Their presentations in the vaka constituted the first significant 
engagement with the public concerning the Cook Islands Marine Park.
It became clear in the public meetings that some stakeholders were hesi-
tant about supporting a large marine protected area because they believed 
it would prohibit local fishing. Instead, audiences learned that the marine 
park would be zoned for multiple uses in a way that would sustainably 
manage all marine resources. Carruthers showed that establishing no-fish-
ing zones in the Great Barrier Reef had been associated with increased 
size and number of fish and increased fishing outside these zones (Reeves 
2011b). Taei compared the marine park to ra‘ui. Explaining a large-scale 
marine protected area in terms of traditional resource management proved 
helpful because more people were familiar with the ra‘ui in the outer 
islands as well as those that had once disappeared on Rarotonga but were 
reintroduced in the 1990s (Tiraa 2006). The idea that the Cook Islands 
eez could be a kind of large ra‘ui also resonated with arguments among 
traditional leaders and others that the people of the Cook Islands own 
national marine resources. During the public meetings, Taei also spoke of 
no-fishing zones as a kind of insurance policy and as a bank account that 
can accrue interest in terms of more and larger fish. 
Metaphors of banking, insurance, and ra‘ui fell under a more general 
trope of the marine park as marine resource ownership that was promi-
nently evoked on a PowerPoint slide Taei used in her presentation. The 
slide contained the phrase “protecting what we own” displayed next to a 
map of the proposed marine park boundary. Within days, the idea of pub-
lic ownership turned up several times in Cook Islands News in relation to 
the marine park. In a story that ran immediately after the public meetings, 
Kevin Iro is quoted as saying, “This marine park is about Cook Islanders 
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protecting what we own” (cin 2011b). The idea that the public owns the 
resources encompassed by the Cook Islands eez was used by participants 
to argue for expanding the boundaries of the proposed marine park from 
nearly half of the eez to the entire zone. This happened during the meeting 
in Takitumu vaka (one of three main districts on Rarotonga) on Wednes-
day evening. According to a Cook Islands News report: 
Any hesitation to support the project stemmed from a belief that the marine 
park should encompass the entire exclusive economic zone (eez), rather than 
just the proposed one million square kilometres of it. . . .
One mama stood up and said: You say to protect what we own, but to me 
we own the whole lot! We should protect the whole lot. . . .
Mii Kauvai of Muri Environment Care group said she came to the public 
meeting undecided about whether to back the marine park proposal. 
After listening to the presentation and looking at what you’ve got there, 
she said, pointing to a slide reading Protecting what we own, I embrace this 
project. (Reeves 2011a) 
This was a common reaction to the presentation. Before the vaka meet-
ings, coverage of the marine park and the marine park trust in the news, 
including letters to the editor, was mostly unfavorable. After the meet-
ings, the general consensus in news coverage and among those involved 
in planning the project was that the marine park had an unusually large 
number of supporters from diverse interest groups including the House 
of Ariki, the Koutu Nui, the opposition Democratic Party, Te Ipukarea 
Society, interested members of the public in Rarotonga, and those from 
the Northern Group islands who were able to attend.
News, Rumor, Gossip, Scandal, and Public Perception
To fully appreciate the dramatic shift in public opinion regarding the pro-
posed marine park, it is important to understand how historical, structural, 
and ecological conditions have coalesced in a political ecology of news, 
rumor, gossip, and scandal in the Cook Islands. Scholars typically distin-
guish between “news” and “rumor,” with the latter referring to informa-
tion that cannot be verified or is later determined to be false (Coast and 
Fox 2015; Stewart and Strathern 2004; White 1994). “Gossip” is often 
distinguished from rumor in terms of topic and scale, both temporal and 
social, meaning that gossip is usually directed toward the behavior of indi-
viduals within a relatively small social group, while rumor can be spread 
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sequentially throughout larger social networks and is concerned with 
events that are more broadly salient (Coast and Fox 2015; Stewart and 
Strathern 2004; White 1994). However, these analytical distinctions can 
blur in practice. For example, gossip can contain rumor, rumors can be a 
form of gossip about individuals, and news can help spread gossip. For 
my purposes, however, precise analytical definitions of these terms is less 
important than understanding all three forms of communication as prac-
tical ways to circulate socially salient information that depends as much 
on the particular circumstances of the social actors involved as on any 
imagined or real truth-value of what is being said. Whether information 
is considered credible depends on personal, political, cultural, and social 
conditions, making a determination of what is news and what is rumor an 
inherently social act. A newspaper, for instance, may insist on the credibil-
ity of its claims, while others, especially those who would be scandalized 
by the news, may allege slander. From this perspective, the truth-value of 
news and rumor is not as important as the effects these forms of commu-
nication can have on public perceptions of moral transgression. 
Scandal results from the publicity of moral transgression that may have 
previously only existed as gossip, rumor, or news on a smaller scale (Adut 
2005). In modern states, including the Cook Islands and other Pacific 
Island countries (see Connell 2007), news media are necessary for creating 
publicity at the national scale and, therefore, for creating national scan-
dals. I suggest that processes of news making, rumor, gossip, and scandal-
ization are carried out not only in private spaces but also in national pub-
lic events and through media outlets like Cook Islands News, a national 
newspaper that publishes six days per week and has a circulation of about 
2,500 copies in a country of approximately 15,000 (Woods 2010a). The 
impact of Cook Islands News on public discourse is even greater than its 
circulation would imply, especially on Rarotonga where it is published, 
because each copy is read by as many as four people (Woods 2010a). 
Furthermore, the newspaper not only serves as a source of news informa-
tion but is also a forum for opinion, accusation, gossip, and rumor in the 
form of letters to the editor and opinion pieces. Unique to Cook Islands 
News is a section called “Smoke Signals” where readers can anonymously 
express their opinions about current events. According to Cook Islands 
News, “Smoke Signals are remarks and observations that range from the 
serious to the sarcastic. Typically anonymous, these quips capture the 
community’s notes on life and events in the Cooks, or what’s echoing 
over the Coconut Wireless” (cin 2016). In short, Cook Islands News jux-
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taposes all three forms of information—news, rumor, and gossip—in a 
consistent format with high circulation and public saturation. I argue that 
Cook Islands News, as the most important national newspaper, does not 
simply report on national scandals but is vital in constituting them by 
creating publicity and providing a forum for public negotiation of moral 
transgressions, especially those by politicians and public servants. Cook 
Islands News, like national media elsewhere, plays an important role in 
scandalization by forming discursive relationships among individuals, the 
public as an imagined national community (see Anderson 1991), and the 
state apparatus. In what follows, I suggest that these processes of scandal-
ization help bring historical events with tangible structural and ecological 
legacies into public consciousness in ways that affect ongoing politics and 
projects of national identity formation.
The Sheraton Hotel Scandal
Emerging scandals are partly interpreted through the lens of previous 
experiences and events, including prior scandals (Jacobsson and Löfmarck 
2008). I begin with what is widely known as the Sheraton Hotel scan-
dal because of its lingering influence on public perceptions of government 
operations and lasting ecological effects in the Cook Islands, especially on 
Rarotonga. In her account of the Sheraton scandal, Cook Islands scholar, 
environmentalist, and Marae Moana Project Manager Jacqueline Evans 
has theorized that thin layers of bureaucracy make states like the Cook 
Islands highly vulnerable to the desires of individuals, geopolitical con-
ditions, and the vagaries of the global economy (Evans 2006). By “thin 
layers of bureaucracy,” she refers to a structural condition characterized 
by a relatively small administrative apparatus with control over major 
decisions, insufficient government transparency, and lack of due process. 
She argues that bureaucratic thinness can have profound effects on small 
island nations and has shown how these conditions contributed to struc-
tural adjustment and environmental degradation in the Cook Islands less 
than three decades after achieving self-government. This situation was 
made possible, in part, by the small size of the government bureaucracy, 
which lacked adequate checks on the use of power by individual cabinet 
ministers and their staff while also providing a cover of secrecy classically 
associated with bureaucracy (Weber 1978). Specifically, these conditions 
allowed Norman George, the acting minister of tourism under the Pupuke 
Robati government in 1987, to unilaterally sign an agreement with Sicel 
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SpA, an Italian construction company, to build a luxury hotel on Raro-
tonga. The deal ultimately placed the Cook Islands government in debt to 
the Istituto Nazionale di Credito per il Lavoro Italiano all’Estero (icle) 
bank of Rome for nz$81 million (us$56.7 million) by 1994. In Octo-
ber 1990, not long after construction on the Italian–Cook Islands hotel 
development began, Sicel SpA was placed under receivership by the Ital-
ian government. Another Italian construction company was contracted 
by icle, but construction was halted permanently when the insurer for 
the development loan froze payment to the Cook Islands after six of its 
members were arrested for connections with organized crime. Eventually, 
the relatively massive government debt resulted in structural adjustment 
measures that both boosted tourism-related development and gutted the 
public service sector, including the National Environment Service, which 
was mandated to assess new developments for environmental impacts. A 
significant lack of environmental oversight contributed to coastal erosion, 
increased pollution, and progressively degraded lagoons on Rarotonga, 
especially in the tourist village of Muri. Years later, as the government was 
attempting to create the largest marine park in the world, the memory of 
the Sheraton and other similar scandals would help condition public opin-
ion about government transparency, the environment, and Marae Moana.
What Now, Fishgate?
Despite a shift in public opinion regarding the marine park after meet-
ings with Sue Taei and Tim Carruthers, the specter of scandal that once 
haunted the marine park trust did not disappear. Instead, suspicions 
that were once directed at the trust and its proposed members, includ-
ing rumors that the trust was connected with organized crime, seemed 
to become more intensely directed toward perceived government secrecy 
within the Ministry of Marine Resources (mmr). Support for the marine 
park seemed to increase along with mistrust of the mmr, in part, because 
the marine park came to be seen by many supporters as a way of creating 
more government transparency in fisheries management. Public concern 
with commercial fisheries revolved around several related issues. The first 
was unease with how the mmr was handling the sale of fishing licenses 
to foreign companies, especially in the Northern Cook Islands. Residents 
from the North reported that commercial fishing vessels had been spotted 
from shore, which if true would mean they were in violation of a ban on 
commercial fishing within twelve nautical miles of each island. The mmr 
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denied that such sightings were possible, but suspicions and reports con-
tinued. This was one of the primary concerns of Cook Islanders from the 
Northern Group who wanted to be included in the marine park; it was 
believed that inclusion in the park would give them greater protection 
from what they perceived to be overfishing by foreign commercial vessels. 
Others disapproved of a new exploratory fishing program implemented 
by the mmr that could grant up to twenty-four new fishing licenses for 
bigeye tuna, broadbill swordfish, and purse seine fishing for skipjack tuna. 
The mmr argued that the new program was a necessary research phase 
in an attempt to establish Cook Islands rights to the fisheries for these 
species. Disapproval of the program, and those implementing it within 
the mmr, stemmed from the secrecy that seemed to surround the issuing 
of licenses. One letter published in Cook Islands News and titled “What 
Now, Fishgate?” is indicative of much of the public discourse concerning 
the licensing plan:
There’s growing opposition to the way the government through its Ministry 
of Marine Resources is handling the future of our oceans. One mmr official, 
who blames the media for the public reaction, needs to realise the backlash is 
because of the way they have foisted the fishery plan on an unsuspecting pub-
lic, and signing the memorandum of understanding with China WITHOUT 
consultation was a strategic mistake. A bit like [former Financial Secretary] 
Sholan Ivaiti and [former Minister of Finance] Sir Terepai Maoate foisting 
their Toa scheme on the public without discussion, because they felt they knew 
better. In a recent email . . . Josh Mitchell replies that he hopes to see people 
attend the public consultations next week. Personally, I don’t think I’ve ever 
seen the media whip up the mass hysteria as well as they have this time around. 
A pity they didn’t let the facts stand in the way of telling a good story. And 
when all else fails, just throw in the word Chinese and watch the horror of the 
general public grow. Anyway, I’ll save my views for the appropriate forum, 
which will be at the planned public consultation where dare I say it, we might 
actually be able to have an informed debate, instead of distorted media tripe. 
One person emailed the newspaper to comment: He believes anyone with a 
different opinion is stupid or misinformed and should be marginalised. He for-
gets that these fish belong to the people not to the mmr and its cronies. If the 
majority is AGAINST it, for ANY reason, it shouldn’t go through. A lousy $7 
million for the rape of our oceans? How much of that is earmarked for a new 
mmr headquarters? (cin 2011d) 
The term “Fishgate” evoked Toagate, a failed attempt by the govern-
ment under the leadership of Prime Minister Jim Marurai to buy a facility 
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from Toa Petroleum in 2009. The scandal had both political and economic 
consequences, resulting in the firing of Deputy Prime Minister Terepai 
Maoate, the sacking of the prime minister from the Democratic Party, 
and an extra tax levied on the public to pay a court-ordered government 
obligation of nz$1.7 million (us$1.2 million) to Toa Petroleum (Jonas-
sen 2011, 211). Toagate resulted from publicity, in national media, about 
how cabinet secrecy affected Cook Islanders and was explicitly linked in 
public discourse with the Sheraton Hotel scandal (Jonassen 2011, 211). 
The letter’s focus on the exploratory fishing program was also evocative 
of an episode in which the mmr granted sixteen annual fishing licenses to 
Taiwanese vessels through the Cook Islands Northern Fishing Company 
in 2008. After the company failed to meet some of its contractual obliga-
tions, an audit found that the mmr had acted in violation of the Cook 
Islands Marine Resources Act (Manins 2011).
Staff within the mmr, including Secretary Ben Ponia (who was not 
involved in the 2008 scandal), attempted to change public opinion by 
explaining the ministry’s rationale for the experimental fishing scheme 
(Ponia 2011). Key to its justification was the fact that all of the targeted 
species are highly migratory, spanning the Pacific Ocean from west to east. 
In addition, nearly all migratory tuna is caught in the western Pacific, with 
only a small fraction caught in the Cook Islands (cin 2011a). This means 
that even a total ban on fishing within the Cook Islands eez would have a 
negligible effect on fisheries conservation. Furthermore, the mmr claimed 
that all fisheries within the Cook Islands were already managed at sustain-
able levels. The claim was, in part, that the Cook Islands has a right to its 
share of marine resources under international law and that exploratory 
fishing is a necessary form of research used to establish the parameters of 
new fisheries. These arguments seemed to make little difference, however, 
if letters to the editor of Cook Islands News are used as a barometer of 
public opinion. A sense of mistrust of the mmr and its dealing with foreign 
companies persisted in public discourse.
Secrecy, Scandal, and Thin Bureaucracy
A common theme of these scandals is the perceived lack of government 
transparency and public consultation on issues that affect the nation 
and local communities. John Woods, who was managing editor of Cook 
Islands News at the time, explicitly linked insufficient government trans-
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parency with national scandals, including those surrounding Toa Petro-
leum and the Sheraton Hotel. He wrote in Cook Islands News: 
[Jacqueline] Evans believes the . . . Sheraton scandal was much worse than the 
current Toagate financial blunder, and concluded: “Personally, I think that if 
we fostered a culture of transparency so that free and immediate online access 
to cabinet minutes was normal practice, the opportunity would be given for 
public input and healthy debate so that we don’t find ourselves in this fix 
again.”
It’s true that both the Sheraton and Toagate deals were done in the secrecy 
of Cabinet meetings, with deliberate intent to deny the public of the right to 
know—and this is wrong morally and democratically. (Woods 2010b) 
Woods’s editorial not only shows the impact of previous scandals on how 
the public comes to understand emerging scandals but also hints at the 
complex entanglements of various forms of information (including aca-
demic scholarship, news, and opinion) in the context of ongoing public 
debates about collective values and moral norms. Specifically, Toagate and 
Sheraton were focal points for public discussions about the role of secrecy 
in state management of national resources. Part of the discussion hinged 
on the use of the Cook Islands Official Information Act (oia), which was 
implemented in October 2009 (Woods 2010a). Specifically, information 
act requests are often not effective in securing information, especially 
regarding government-issued fishing licenses. On 31 July 2012, Cook 
Islands News submitted an information act request to the mmr for infor-
mation on what appeared in the national budget to be twenty additional 
licenses under its exploratory fishing program. The request was denied. In 
response to the query about whether the mmr had issued additional fish-
ing licenses, the secretary of the mmr wrote: “Pursuant to section 18 of 
the oia Act I have decided that further elaboration of this request is not 
warranted primarily on the basis that the request is frivolous” (Reeves 
2012). The secretary also responded to an information act request about 
details of the fishing licenses themselves: “I have decided that details of 
the license agreements will be withheld pursuant to sections 8 & sections 
6 of the oia Act primarily on the basis that fishing license [sic] are a com-
mercial and confidential arrangement between the Crown and the fishing 
vessel owner or operator and that disclosure could prejudice the entrust-
ment of information to Government, maintenance of law and to prevent 
improper gain or improper advantage” (Reeves 2012). Two years later, 
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the mmr denied another information act request from Cook Islands News 
regarding a settlement reached with the owners of a purse seine vessel 
rumored to have been illegally operating in Cook Islands waters. The min-
istry also threatened legal action if any details of the arrangement were 
subsequently published (Samoglou 2014).
Secrecy, often glossed as a lack of transparency, is a classic feature of 
bureaucracy (Weber 1978). However, state secrecy is especially salient 
in thin bureaucracies, where it enables as few as one or two individuals 
within the state apparatus to have dramatic effects on the nation-state as 
a whole. In the case of large ocean management, this socio-structural con-
dition is paired with ecological opacity, meaning that knowledge of what 
is happening far offshore is subject to a great deal of uncertainty and is 
always highly mediated. Monitoring of offshore activities like commercial 
fishing and ecological research is a capital-intensive endeavor. As a conse-
quence, public debate about ocean issues can be significantly influenced 
by the quality of public trust in the organizations responsible for produc-
ing and communicating environmental knowledge about the ocean. In the 
Cook Islands, scandals like Toagate and Sheraton eroded public trust in 
some information conveyed by the government. In both cases, bureau-
cratic thinness included informatic thinness, which, as explained earlier, 
involves disproportionate influence of a few individuals over publically 
important, officially sanctioned information. I suggest that in the Cook 
Islands, informatic thinness is partially interpreted through the lens of pre-
vious government scandals in ways that render some information, includ-
ing rumor and gossip, apparently more trustworthy than others, including 
some officially sanctioned messages. In particular, the informatic thinness 
concerning commercial fishing practices and previous scandals revolving 
around a lack of government transparency combined to make rumors of 
misconduct by the mmr and fishing companies seem more credible to 
some social actors. This informal, speculative knowledge was circulated 
via public fora and nationally distributed print media. Through letters to 
the editor of Cook Islands News, and even more so through Smoke Sig-
nals, individuals aired their suspicions, found an audience for their accusa-
tions, and passed along rumor to an imagined national community. Public 
opinion mingled with expert opinion and more traditional news articles 
to produce a variable terrain of publicity on which moral transgression 
was alleged, denied, and negotiated, thus facilitating greater visibility of 
marine environmental issues as national ethical concerns.
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From Fishgate to Fingate
In addition to evoking the Sheraton Hotel scandal and Toagate, the 
exploratory fishing scheme also raised concerns among conservation 
groups about increased shark finning within the Cook Islands. Te Ipu-
ka rea Society wrote articles and letters to Cook Islands News expressing 
its concern and calling for a ban on technologies such as wire traces that 
were seen as specifically targeting sharks. The issue of shark conservation 
was visible through the work of another local nongovernmental organiza-
tion, the Pacific Islands Conservation Initiative, which was lobbying for 
a shark sanctuary that would encompass the entire eez and complement 
the already existing Cook Islands Whale Sanctuary. Both groups were con-
cerned about the potential impacts of a draft National Plan of Action for 
Sharks created by the mmr. During a public consultation held by the min-
istry, it became clear that stakeholders did not support the mmr’s plan for 
a sustainable shark fishery. Te Ipukarea Society, the Pacific Islands Conser-
vation Initiative, the Natural Heritage Trust, and the Aronga Mana unani-
mously voiced their support for a policy that would allow zero retention 
of sharks (Scott 2012).
Within a week of the National Plan of Action for Sharks meeting, 
 stories began running in Cook Islands News about an international sur-
veillance operation led by the New Zealand Navy that had allegedly found 
approximately three tons of shark fins aboard a transit vessel in Cook 
Islands waters. The value of the fins was estimated at nz$3 million (us$2.3 
million) (Smylie 2012). In a parliamentary session, Deputy Leader of the 
Opposition Wilkie Rasmussen claimed he knew from a reliable source 
that the fins were indeed found and that one of the vessels caught in the 
operation was owned by Luen Thai, a company that had been awarded 
exploratory fishing licenses. Minister of Marine Resources Teina Bishop 
denied knowledge of any shark fins and later denied that any had been 
found, while mmr Secretary Ben Ponia denied the allegations and claimed 
they were a result of sensationalist rumors (Smylie 2012). Cook Islands 
News insisted on the validity of its multiple sources, some of which it 
claimed were “close to mmr” (Smylie 2012).
As a result, further expressions of anger appeared in public discourse. 
Some readers of Cook Islands News wrote letters to the editor or to 
Smoke Signals. One angrily asked: “Just how many sharks would have 
been killed to produce 3,000 kg of shark fins? What is the maximum 
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fine that can be imposed on the offenders? What is the maximum jail 
term that can be imposed on the offenders?” (cin 2012). Another wrote: 
“Numerous calls to Cook Islands News last week before even going to 
parliament is evidence that shark fins were caught on board a Luen Thai 
vessel by the New Zealand navy ship, oops, but hey, now that the billion-
aire director is here, let’s stay hush-hush aye Mr Bishop” (cin 2013). The 
situation seemed even more frustrating because it was informatically thin. 
Specifically, the New Zealand Navy would not comment on the report 
but insisted that any official account of the operation would have to be 
released to the public by the Cook Islands mmr. This meant that the story 
reported by Cook Islands News could not be officially verified and was 
subject to allegations that the newspaper was reporting rumor and gossip 
as news. At the same time, unofficial accounts of what happened seemed 
to gain credibility. A sense of scandal grew as public discourse intensified 
a commitment to shark preservation as a national value. On 12 December 
2012, with overwhelming public support, the government declared the 
entire Cook Islands eez a shark sanctuary. 
Through the fisheries scandals, marine resource management and 
the conduct of the mmr had become highly visible political issues. This 
is important for at least two reasons. First, through national coverage 
of commercial fisheries, the management of the Cook Islands eez was 
 transformed into an object of intensified national moral discourse. Per-
haps this is not very surprising in an Island nation with a dramatic con-
trast between the availability of terrestrial and marine resources, but it is 
also not inevitable. Second, public frustration with the mmr was palpable 
immediately before, during, and after the vaka consultations with Sue Taei 
and Tim Carruthers and throughout a period that was critical in form-
ing public opinion about the marine park. Within this context, it makes 
sense that ideas like public participation, multi-sector management, and 
citizen ownership of marine resources were persuasive. It is my contention 
that the marine park became vigorously supported by a broad spectrum 
of interested parties within an increasingly dense atmosphere of frustra-
tion with state secrecy that grew in response to government scandals and, 
more recently, the perceived opacity of the mmr. This claim is supported 
by interviews with steering committee members, one of whom both sup-
ported the marine park and insisted that nothing existed in the eez for a 
marine park to manage except commercial fisheries and, perhaps some-
day, manganese nodule mining. The implication was that the Ministry of 
Marine Resources itself needed reform. Another committee member said 
durbin • what now, fishgate? 17
that the structure of the mmr was a major concern because too much 
power over national marine resources was concentrated in the hands of 
only two people, the secretary and the minister. Ultimately, and despite 
the mmr’s sometimes vocal resistance to creating the Cook Islands Marine 
Park, public perception of the ministry’s actions helped galvanize support 
for making Marae Moana. 
A New Phase of Nation Making in the Cook Islands? 
Anthropologists have long noted that scandal, and the ability to scandal-
ize properly, can contribute to a sense of community (Gluckman 1963). 
According to this functionalist sensibility, scandals are only possible if 
social norms exist and can be publically violated (Jacobsson and Löf-
marck 2008; Neckel 2005). National scandals occur when nationally 
shared norms are perceived to have been transgressed. From this perspec-
tive, scandal in the Cook Islands is less about corruption or dysfunction in 
any simple sense (although both may exist) and more about relationships 
among moral codes, norm violations, publicity, and evocations of public 
anger. However, it is not only the case that scandal reinforces moral codes 
and social norms; it can also produce and modify them. After Fishgate 
and Fingate, the ocean became a more intense object of public ethical 
awareness. Over the course of a succession of scandals, new ways of talk-
ing about the ocean as an object of moral concern were modified and 
invented, and the marine park became central to public discussion and 
negotiation as a way of opening a sense of possibility and alternatives for 
the nation’s ecological future. Because many of these discussions were car-
ried out in public and in the context of a national project, I suggest that 
scandal has been a means of nation making in the Cook Islands (see Foster 
1997 on other modes of nation making in the Pacific).
It is significant, in this context, that the Cook Islands Marine Park was 
later recast as Marae Moana, a name that evokes the sacredness of the 
ocean on a national register. To violate a marae was once punishable by 
death, and the violation of these structures is still met with outpourings of 
community anger. Importantly, the restoration of marae has been a sym-
bolic component of previous nation-making projects in the Cook Islands 
(Sissons 1999). In the name “Marae Moana,” this sense of the sacred 
intersects with international law and is extended in public discourse 
throughout the Cook Islands eez. I claim that in contributing to Marae 
Moana, this particular history of scandal also contributed to a re-formed 
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and emerging sense of imagined national community and identity within 
the Cook Islands. This is not to imply, however, that fisheries scandals 
somehow account for the importance of the ocean to Cook Islanders or 
its contribution to a sense of national or regional identity. Many scholars 
have followed Hau‘ofa in emphasizing the prominence of the ocean as 
a means of identification throughout Oceania.4 Furthermore, I am not 
suggesting that Cook Islanders have historically been inattentive to, or 
unconcerned about, their environments. Instead, I am making the more 
precise claim that support for the creation of Marae Moana has been an 
important occasion for increased public debate about the ocean, within 
national fora and as an object of national ethical value, and that these 
negotiations have brought previous nation-making projects and concerns 
together under a common rubric of large-scale marine management that 
did not previously exist. In what follows, I will contextualize this argu-
ment within a historical account of Cook Islands nation-making projects. 
Toward Big Ocean Nationalism: Phases of Cook Islands  
Nation Making
Jeffrey Sissons has argued that a sense of national identity in the Cook 
Islands emerged through four historically distinct phases (Sissons 1999). 
The first phase began in 1965 with the initiation of self-government and 
ended in 1974. During this period, and under the charismatic leadership 
of Premier Albert Henry, a modern nation was built and characterized 
by centralized planning, state-controlled media, elaborate spectacles that 
revived traditional motifs, mass participation in national projects, and 
increased international aid. At this time, the House of Ariki was formed 
to serve ceremonial purposes, and traditional dance became a symbol 
of Cook Islands identity both internally and globally, through groups of 
dancing “ambassadors.” Dance remains integral to maintaining a sense of 
nation through competitions at Constitution Day celebrations, the Miss 
Cook Islands pageant, and at international events, including the 43rd 
Pacific Islands Forum held on Rarotonga, where the government officially 
declared its intentions to create the Cook Islands Marine Park. 
Sissons traced the beginning of a second phase to the completion of 
the Rarotonga airport on 1 November 1973, also known as dc 8 Day 
(after the Douglas dc-8 jetliner). New access to global tourism markets 
meant that promoting the Cook Islands as a cultural nation could pay off 
economically. In the same year, the government created the Koutu Nui, a 
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national body for those holding local traditional titles of mata‘iapo and 
rangatira. The role of the Koutu Nui was to advise the government on 
matters of culture and, in theory, to complement the House of Ariki. Dur-
ing this period the Cultural Development Division was also created. Pre-
vious displays of national unity, such as dancing, were reinterpreted as a 
form of economic development. Māori culture was promoted in schools, 
while national identity, state legitimacy, development, and culture became 
increasingly entangled.
While the role of traditional culture and tourism was more visible in 
the nation-making process during this period, other national aspirations 
are left out of Sissons’s account but have reemerged as important for the 
Cook Islands as a Large Ocean State that is attempting to create one of 
the world’s largest marine parks. From nearly the beginning of self-gov-
ernment, Albert Henry believed that access to commercial fisheries and 
potential seabed mining would be important means of nation building and 
future economic growth. On 29 July 1974, he addressed the 46th meeting 
of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to advocate for a two-hun-
dred-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone that would give ocean states 
access not only to fisheries but also to seabed mineral resources (unclos 
1974). The Cook Islands then became an early member of sopac (Pacific 
Islands Applied Geoscience Commission), the organization responsible 
for developing seabed minerals in the Pacific region (Howorth 2009). 
Given the long-standing national interest in seabed mining, it is not sur-
prising that the Cook Islands passed the world’s first deep-sea minerals 
mining legislation on 31 March 2009 (Lynch 2011). In this context, it is 
somewhat easier to understand how government could promote the Cook 
Islands Marine Park and resource development simultaneously. From the 
beginning, Prime Minister Puna was clear that the marine park would not 
prevent resource extraction but rather enhance it by rendering it more sus-
tainable. The problem of how it would accomplish the concurrent goals 
of developing marine resources and promoting the Cook Islands as a des-
tination for environmentally concerned travelers was seen as a technical 
challenge to be resolved through the process of marine spatial planning 
within the park boundaries.
The third phase, according to Sissons, was precipitated by a change in 
political leadership from the Cook Islands Party to the Democratic Party. 
Beginning in 1978, the Democratic Party, under the leadership of Prime 
Minister Thomas Davis, began to significantly weaken the cultural insti-
tutions that had lent legitimacy to the Cook Islands Party and to shift the 
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country away from a dominant understanding of the nation as a cultural 
community to a vision of the Cook Islands as an economic unit. Davis 
closed down the Cultural Development Division in 1980 and curtailed gov-
ernment sponsorship of cultural development in general. This amounted 
to a kind of reversal of Albert Henry’s policies. Whereas Henry wanted to 
develop culture as a way to attract tourists, Davis wanted to develop the 
tourism sector directly. The changes resulted in economic growth, includ-
ing the development of a significant university-educated middle class. 
The fourth phase corresponds to the reemergence of the Cook Islands 
Party under the leadership of Albert Henry’s nephew, Geoffrey Henry, 
in January 1989. With this change in leadership, the project of cultural 
nationalism returned. However, thanks to the technocratic successes of 
the Davis administration, it was much better funded. With the growth 
of tourism in the Cook Islands, awareness increased among the educated 
middle class about the benefits of promoting an ethnic identity among 
Cook Islanders. In November 1990, Geoffrey Henry established the Min-
istry of Cultural Development, through which dance reemerged as a state 
project. Importantly, the ministry was also instrumental in making prep-
arations for the 1992 Festival of Pacific Arts, held on Rarotonga. The 
festival, with the theme “Seafaring Pacific Islanders,” was an occasion 
for the arrival of sixteen vaka moana (oceangoing canoes) from across 
Oceania. The event is now widely understood to have involved the largest 
vaka flotilla in over a century (Lewis-Harris 1994), with subsequent vaka 
pageants seen as enacting and building regional connectivity and identity 
(Hau‘ofa 1994; Thomas 1997). The vaka moana were also an important 
symbol for Cook Islands nation building under the leadership of Geof-
frey Henry and included seven vessels constructed in the Cook Islands, 
including two built on Rarotonga and five sailed from the outer islands of 
Mauke, Mitiaro, Atiu, Mangaia, and Aitutaki (Kauraka 1993). The festi-
val, in short, marked both a strengthening of national identity, based on 
the development of traditional arts, and a contribution to more extensive 
oceanic networks of people, practices, ideas, and things that continues 
today. As more recent voyages show, however, there is also now a clear 
emphasis on what the vaka moana can say about large-scale ocean health 
and environmental stewardship within the Cook Islands, in Oceania, and 
globally. 
The four phases of nation building identified here are limited—as all 
historically specific research must be—but also diagnostically useful for 
analyzing emerging trends. Specifically, Sissons’s work was published dur-
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ing what might be identified as a fifth phase of nation making, that can be 
seen as characterized by aggressive neoliberal reforms, including privatiza-
tion of government functions (see also Firth 2000; Murray 2000). Given 
the narrative outlined thus far, this shift within the Cook Islands could 
be located in the Sheraton Hotel scandal and the resulting consequences 
of structural adjustment measures, including downsizing of the National 
Environment Service, environmental degradation, and a subsequent 
increase in environmental awareness and activism. Te Ipukarea Society 
was also founded during this period as a direct response to the down-
sizing of the government environmental sector; it has been important in 
channeling international resources into the Cook Islands for environmen-
tal projects and raising awareness for environmental issues, including the 
need for better nature conservation in the Cook Islands. This attitude is 
also reflected in Prime Minister Puna’s distinctly neoliberal push to fos-
ter sustainable development by rebranding the Cook Islands as a “clean 
and green” destination for conscientious tourists while also promoting the 
expansion of commercial fisheries and seabed mining.5 
If nation building in the Cook Islands roughly corresponds with these 
phases, then there is good reason to pay attention to what appears to be 
an emerging, integrative phase of nation making, marked by an attempt to 
incorporate previous projects meant to foster economic development (eg, 
through tourism, fisheries, and potential seabed mining); education (by 
inculcating a sense of national pride in young Cook Islanders); and Māori 
culture (including dance and traditional voyaging) under a broad rubric of 
large-scale ocean management. I call this process “big ocean nationalism” 
and argue that it is marked by a trend toward greater large-scale environ-
mental awareness among Cook Islanders and the integration of traditional 
culture (especially voyaging), economic development, and other domestic 
concerns with a focus on marine spatial planning and management. For 
example, environmental themes were foregrounded when the vaka moana 
returned to Rarotonga approximately twenty years after they arrived for 
the 1992 Pacific Arts Festival. This time, the voyaging canoes were there 
not only in the context of Pacific arts but also as a way to raise awareness 
in the Cook Islands and Oceania more broadly concerning important envi-
ronmental issues such as shark finning, marine pollution, climate change, 
and the Cook Islands Marine Park. Tourists visiting Rarotonga now have 
ample opportunities to visit ra‘ui that have been reinstated since 1998; a 
whale research center, where they can learn about a 2.2 million square 
kilometer whale sanctuary; and a Marae Moana information hub, where 
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they can use interactive geospatial software to experience marine park 
planning. Since 2008, Lagoon Day in the Cook Islands has also become 
a highly visible way for government and nongovernment organizations 
to promote environmental stewardship as a personal and national virtue. 
Through the event (which is held annually but not always in the same 
month), students, the broader public, and tourists have been introduced 
to ecological challenges and solutions—not least among them, the Cook 
Islands Marine Park. 
Lagoon Day: Toward a Clean and Green Nation
I attended Lagoon Day on 16–17 July 2012 in the village of Arorangi. The 
event included several educational venues that stretched from an inland 
landfill to the beach, the implicit message being that everything from land 
to reef and from reef to ocean is ecologically connected. Between these two 
extremes, in the building that houses the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Planning, busloads of schoolchildren from all grade levels waited to see 
exhibits and to view a short video about the Cook Islands Marine Park. 
Produced by Kevin Iro, the film featured upbeat music, footage of young 
people enjoying the beach, scenes from Rarotonga, and some representa-
tions of the more graphic consequences of marine environmental change, 
such as overfishing and marine pollution. According to its creators, the 
purpose of the four-minute video was to help young Cook Islanders feel a 
sense of pride in their country’s global environmental leadership, to facili-
tate a sense of ownership of their ocean, and to educate them about the 
importance of environmental stewardship through the marine park. 
The film served its purpose admirably. I observed three sets of roughly 
twenty students view the video. It had comic moments that evoked laugh-
ter, such as a surfing Jack Russell Terrier or jokes made by celebrities. 
The students were especially attentive during the celebrity portion of the 
film. Teuila Blakely and other cast members from Shortland Street, a long-
running tv show in New Zealand that is also popular in the Cook Islands, 
congratulated the Cook Islands on creating the marine park. After the film 
was over, Iro asked a few questions that evoked the main messages of the 
film. What is happening to the ocean? How much is protected? How big 
is the Cook Islands Marine Park? The last question was always the same: 
“Do you want to watch it again?” Each time the answer was a resound-
ing and collective, “Yes!” But enthusiasm was not limited to students. It 
also seemed to foster a sense of pride among adults, including one who 
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verbalized a special connection to a moment when the narrator said, “The 
world needs a hero,” while an image of the Cook Islands flag and a map 
of the marine park faded into view. In another powerful moment, the 
narrator spoke about the marine park’s relative size (“four times the size 
of New Zealand” and “eight times the size of England”) before moving 
on to scenes from Rarotonga and speaking about how one of the small-
est countries is making the largest protected area in the world. As repre-
sented in the video, the marine park is as much about fostering a renewed 
sense of national pride through large-scale marine management as it is 
a technical mechanism for creating management and conservation. It is 
also clear that the marine park was intended to be an initiative explicitly 
aimed at strengthening the nation by addressing some of its most pressing 
economic, environmental, and demographic challenges. In precisely this 
sense, the creation of Marae Moana is indicative of an emerging phase of 
nation making in the Cook Islands, one that tends toward the articulation 
of previous ambitions, concerns, and projects through an idiom of ocean 
protection and management at scale.
Celebratory public events such as Lagoon Day or the return of the 
vaka moana are important rituals of big ocean nationalism6 and may 
seem to have little in common with the succession of scandals described 
previously. In the case of the Cook Islands, however, both have been 
important for rendering the ocean more visible as an object of national 
concern. A succession of scandals, from the Sheraton Hotel to what I 
have referred to as Fingate, involved national-scale publicity of potential 
or actual moral norm violations committed, or widely perceived to have 
been committed, primarily by public servants and political figures. While 
all of these scandals involved state secrecy and at least the perception of 
public harm, later scandals carried senses of national and community 
identity into public negotiations of marine resource use and management 
at massive scales. In these public spaces, as with more celebratory ritu-
als, what it means to be a Cook Islander in relation to the ocean is being 
formed and remade.
Conclusion
I have argued that previous nation-making projects and national concerns 
in the Cook Islands are becoming integrated through big ocean nation-
alism, that is, under a rubric of large-scale ocean management that has 
emerged within a context of preceding and ongoing domestic scandals. 
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These  scandals are related to structural conditions that I have described, 
building on Evans (2006), as both bureaucratically and informatically 
thin. Thinness helps enable individuals to make potentially large impacts 
at the national scale by gaining disproportionate influence over the state 
apparatus while remaining largely hidden from public view. Through 
events like the Sheraton Hotel scandal, both transgressions of moral 
norms and their adverse effects became publicized through nationwide 
media outlets like Cook Islands News. It was in this milieu of prior 
scandals that strong public support for the marine park almost did not 
materialize and in which the marine park trust was initially a target of 
public concern and cynicism. Circumstances began to change, however, 
when visitors from sprep and Conservation International reframed the 
initiative as a means of indigenous and public ownership (as a very large 
ra‘ui) at a time of increasing dissatisfaction with the Ministry of Marine 
Resources that included perceptions of secrecy and corruption. These 
sentiments culminated, in this particular ethnographic account, with the 
shark finning scandal. As I have argued, however, scandal does not nec-
essarily detract from a sense of national belonging so much as produce 
and recreate it. Through scandal, moral positions are staked out, alli-
ances are formed, arguments are played out, and norms are affirmed, 
modified, or made more explicit. During the inception of Marae Moana, 
national scandal was both shaped by preceding transgressions of pub-
lic moral norms and came to revolve most explicitly around large-scale 
ocean management. In short, the emergence of the Cook Islands as a 
Large Ocean State paralleled a growing sense of belonging to a big ocean 
nation that was mediated, and to some extent fostered, by scandal. Pro-
cesses of scandalization and nation making, therefore, have formed an 
important milieu in which Marae Moana, as one of an increasing num-
ber of large-scale marine protected areas, has emerged. However, it is 
precisely these kinds of complex social, political, and cultural processes 
that have thus far been least critically studied by the scholars and prac-
titioners who are most concerned with large-scale ocean management in 
the Pacific. 
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Notes
1 But see De Santo, Jones, and Miller 2011 and De Santo 2013 for a critical 
perspective on large marine protected areas, and see Gruby and others 2016 for 
an argument that more social science research on large marine protected areas is 
needed.
2 Subsequent to the period covered by the ethnographic research used in this 
essay, the Cook Islands declared its intention to expand the Cook Islands Marine 
Park (Marae Moana) to its entire eez, which comprises over 2 million square 
kilometers.
3 Although Marae Moana is often translated for general audiences as “Sacred 
Ocean” (rnz 2016), the term marae typically indicates a formal gathering place. 
However, because marae, and especially ancient marae, in the Cook Islands are 
regarded as sacred (tapu), the translation in this case makes sense.
4 See D’Arcy 2001, 2003; Diaz 2012; Fry 1994, 1997; Gershon 2007; Hanlon 
2009; Hau‘ofa 1994, 1998; Jolly 2001, 2007; Lilomaiava-Doktor 2009.
5 Promoting the Cook Islands as a “clean and green” destination was included 
in the Cook Islands Party Manifesto 2010–2014 (Cook Islands Party 2010).
6 It should be obvious that, as with the vaka moana, Marae Moana is not sim-
ply reducible to a nation-building project or a sense of national identity. All large 
marine protected areas participate in broader discourses and events. Nevertheless, 
how larger discursive, economic, political, and other processes are harnessed and 
reformed for the purposes of emerging Large Ocean States and big ocean nations 
is of particular interest here.
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Abstract
Although large marine protected areas have become a dominant strategy for 
marine biodiversity conservation, especially in Oceania, scholars have mostly 
ignored the historical, social, cultural, and political contexts that have contrib-
uted to the emergence and development of these institutions. In this ethnographic 
essay, I discuss the inception of the Cook Islands Marine Park (Marae Moana), 
an approximately one-million-square-kilometer mixed-use marine protected area 
in the southern half of the Cook Islands exclusive economic zone. I show that 
although many stakeholders in the Cook Islands did not initially support the 
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marine park concept, the process of making Marae Moana eventually became 
a medium for rearticulating social values and aspirations in the face of serious 
challenges to the nation, state, economy, and environment. This transformation, 
from public criticism to broad stakeholder support, was conditioned by public 
perceptions of previous and emerging national scandals that tended to intensify 
support for the marine park because it was seen, by many, as a project that would 
increase government transparency. In particular, concerns over scandals related to 
fisheries and other environmental issues foregrounded the ocean as an ethical and 
political object for all Cook Islanders and recast large-scale marine protection as a 
national virtue. Marae Moana became a nation-making project that was intended 
to foster a sense of pride among Cook Islanders while also integrating previous 
state priorities such as economic development, modernization, traditional culture, 
and tourism. 
keywords: Cook Islands, large marine protected areas, Marae Moana, rumor, 
gossip, scandal, nation making
